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CHAPTER 8 
Zoning and Land U set 
RICHARD G. HUBER* 
§ 8.1. Boston Linkage Payments: Authority. During the 1986 Survey 
year, Massachusetts courts reviewed Boston's controversial linkage pro-
gram. The linkage program, embodied in article 26 of the Boston Zoning 
Code, authorizes the City to exact fees from large-scale commercial 
developers seeking zoning relief. The fees are then dedicated to aug-
menting the pool of low and moderate income housing in the city. 1 The 
rationale behind the linkage concept is that because large-scale devel-
opment attracts upper-income dwellers and displaces lower-income 
dwellers, commercial developers should therefore pay for the benefits 
they receive through such displacement. Nevertheless, without a rational 
nexus between the "wrong" committed by developers and the payment 
of a "penalty," linkage exactions may run afoul of developers' due pro-
cess rights. 2 
In Bonan v. City of Boston,3 a group of abutters to the Massachusetts 
General Hospital filed suit against the hospital and the City.4 The plaintiffs 
challenged a zoning map amendment that the Boston Zoning Commission 
had granted to the hospital, contingent upon the payment of linkage fees. 
The abutters argued that the City did not have the authority to enact the 
tEd. Note: In order to keep the ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW current, the 1986 zoning and 
land use chapter surveys both 1986 and 1985 cases. 
*RICHARD G. HUBER specializes in the areas of Property and Land Use Law in his 
teaching and is the former Dean of Boston College Law School. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the assistance of Tracey L. Davis, Joyce E. Rawlings, and Paul E. Salamanca 
in preparing this chapter. 
§ 8.1. 1 Article 26 authorizes the City of Boston to exact $6 per square foot of floor 
area above 100,000 square feet in exchange for zoning relief for any new or rehabilitated 
commercial space in the downtown area. The Boston Zoning Commission adopted article 
26 in 1983. See BOSTON ZONING CODE art. 26, § 2 (1983). 
2 Inclusionary Housing and Linkage Programs in Metropolitan Boston, Metropolitan Area 
Planning Council, 33-34 (1986). See generally Symposium, Exactions: A Controversial 
New Source for Municipal Funds, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. (1987). See also the 
resulting United States Supreme Court decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 
The Court recently granted certiorari on appeal from the California Court of Appeal's 
decision, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986). 
3 398 Mass. 315, 4% N.E.2d 640 (1986). 
4 The defendants included the Zoning Commission of Boston, the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority, and the hospital. 
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linkage program, and that the hospital would not have obtained zoning 
relief but for its pledge to pay linkage fees. The defendants challenged 
the abutters' standing to contest the linkage issue. The City also argued 
that it had at least implicit authority, under the enumerated purposes of 
Boston's zoning act,5 to enact the linkage program. 
In ruling for the plaintiffs, the superior court held that the abutters had 
standing to challenge article 26 and the zoning map amendment because 
they were persons aggrieved by the Zoning Commission's grant of relief 
to the hospital. 6 The court examined Boston's zoning enabling act in 
detail, and held that the Zoning Commission lacked authority to enact 
article 26, and subsequently declared the article null and void. 7 
The superior court reasoned that although the purposes of Boston's 
zoning act are broad, the powers it conveys are narrowly drawn, and do 
not explicitly or implicitly include the power to exact a fee in exchange 
for zoning relief. 8 Additionally, the court noted that the linkage exaction 
in many ways resembled a tax, and as such, required specific statutory 
authorization. 9 Finally, the superior court noted that in amending chapter 
40A, which does not apply to Boston, the legislature explicitly authorized 
incentive zoning, which is analagous to the linkage concept. 10 Therefore, 
had the legislature intended to grant Boston the authority to enact a 
linkage program, it would have stated so explicitly. 11 
Upon direct review, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision 
of the superior court, ruling that plaintiffs were not entitled to a ruling 
on the linkage issue. The Court noted that the plaintiffs were not liable 
for linkage fees themselves, and added that if the plaintiffs believed that 
the hospital's pledge to pay fees had improperly influenced the Zoning 
Commission, the plaintiffs' only course of action was to challenge the 
zoning map amendment in superior court. 12 The Court thus failed to 
reach the issue of the City's authority to enact article 26, although it did 
state that the City might seek authority via legislation. 13 Although it failed 
to reach the issue of linkage as it relates to the City of Boston, the 
Supreme Judicial Court remarked in a footnote, that chapter 40A, section 
9, appears to authorize linkage programs in those communities to which 
5 Bonan v. City of Boston, Suffolk Super. Ct. No. 76438, (March 31, 1986). See G.L. c. 
40A, § 9. 
6 Bonan, No. 76438, slip. op. at 13-21. 
7 /d. at 14-19. 
8 /d. at 19-20. 
9 See Mass. G.L. c. 40A, § 9. 
10 Bonan, No. 76438, slip op. at 21. 
11 Bonan v. City of Boston, 378 Mass. 315, 320-23, 496 N.E.2d 640, 644-56 (1986). 
12 id. at 323, 496 N.E.2d at 645. 
13 /d. at 323, 496 N.E.2d at 645. 
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it applies. 14 As a result, should the legislature extend to Boston the 
authority to implement linkage programs, the program will likely with-
stand subsequent judkial scrutiny. 
§ 8.2. Nonconforming uses: Expansion of Residential Use. The Zoning 
Act, chapter 40A, has occasionally been criticized for its langu·age, which 
often makes interpretation, or even comprehension, difficult. The first 
two sections of section 6, 1 concerning the treatment of nonconforming 
uses, were criticized in Fitzsimonds v. Board of Appeals of Chatham. 2 
In Fitzsimonds, the plaintiff appellants obtained a building permit to 
expand their one-story summer home by raising a dormer to create a 
liveable second story. Their house was one of ten units originally part of 
a cottage colony that was converted into condominium units in 1976. The 
Fitzsimonds obtained title to the house and the "footprint" of land on 
which it stood, plus a one-tenth undivided interest in the common areas 
and facilities. The colony as a whole comprised 80,000 square feet. The 
Fitzsimonds had a restriction in their deed that they would not occupy 
the premises year-round. 
The Fitzsimonds' summer home was a nonconforming use under a 
Chatham by-law enacted in 1978 requiring condominiums without public 
water or sewer access, such as the Fitzsimonds', to have a minimum lot 
area of 15,000 square feet. 3 Without regard to the area of their footprint, 
14 /d. at 319 n.9, 496 N.E.2d at 693 n.9. 
§ 8.2. 1 The language ofG.L. c. 40A, § 6, (the first two sentences) is a particularly good 
example of the poor drafting of much of chapter 40A, and reads as follows: 
Except as hereinafter provided, a zoning ordinance or by-law shall not apply to 
structures or uses lawfully in existence or lawfully begun, or to a liuilding or special 
permit issued before the first publication of notice of the public hearing on such 
ordinance or by-law required by section five, but shall apply to any change or 
substantial extension of such use, to a building or special permit issued after the 
first notice of said public hearing, to any reconstruction, extension or structural 
change of such structure and to any alteration of a structure begun after the first 
notice of said public hearing to provide for its use for a substantially different purpose 
or for the same purpose in a substantially different manner or 'to a substantiatly 
greater extent except where alteration, reconstruction, extension or structural change 
to a single or two-family residential structure does not increase the nonconforming 
nature of said structure. Preexisting nonconforming structures or uses may be ex-
tended or altered, provided, that no such extension or alteration shall be permitted 
unless there is a finding by the permit granting authority or by the special permit 
granting authority designated by ordinance or by-law that such change, extension or 
alteration shall not be substantially more detrimental than the existing nonconforming 
use to the neighborhood , .. , 
G.L. c. 40A, § 6. 
2 21 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 484 N ,K2d 113 (1985), 
3 Fitzsimonds, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 54, 484 N.E.2d at 115 (citing SouTH CHATHAM, 
MASS., BY-LAW L46 (1978)). 
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the Fitzsimonds' one-tenth interest in the 80,000 square foot parcel could 
not conceivably meet this minimum. 
When the Fitzsimonds were nearly finished raising their dormer, the 
building inspector issued a stop-work order, and informed the Fitzsi-
monds to apply for a special permit. After a public hearing, the Chatham 
Board of Appeals denied the permit, emphasizing that were the building 
permit granted, it would then be difficult to later deny a permit allowing 
year-round occupancy. Unhappy with the board's decision, the Fitzsi-
monds filed a complaint in superior court under chapter 40A, section 17. 
Without a detailed discussion, the judge upheld the board's action as not 
arbitrary or capricious and the plaintiffs appealed.4 
In remanding the plaintiff's petition to the board for reconsideration, 
the Appeals Court noted that the board had improperly interpreted chap-
ter 40A, section 6, which governs the treatment of nonconforming uses. 
The court held that under section 6, a zoning ordinance does not apply 
to the extension of a single-family residential structure,5 provided that 
the extension does not increase the nonconforming nature of the struc-
ture. 6 If, however, the extension does increase the nonconforming nature 
of the structure, then, and only then, may the board consider whether 
the extension would be more detrimental than the existing nonconforming 
use.7 The court pointed out that the board had skipped the first step and 
addressed the second issue exclusively. 
The court also ruled that the board erred by taking into account the 
anticipated difficulty in denying year-round occupancy permits, because 
this was a "putative problem to be found in the indefinite future upon 
now uncertain facts."8 The court noted, however, that the board was 
empowered to consider the plaintiffs' applications as a "bellwether" of 
other applications, because two other stop-work orders had been issued. 
The board was thus authorized, on remand for rehearing, to weigh other 
issues, such as parking, density, and sewage difficulties. 9 
The court reached what seems the proper interpretation of the first 
sentence of chapter 40A, section 6. Statutory interpretation in accordance 
with the "plain meaning" rule has been subject to substantial criticisms 
for some decades. It does, however, seem unwarranted for legislatures 
to draft statutes so that the language, and the subsequent construction 
4 Fitzsimonds, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 55, 484 N.E.2d at ll5. 
5 For procedural economy, the court proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff's cottage 
constituted a single-family residence within the meaning of section 6. I d. at 56, 484 N .E.2d 
at l160. 
6 Id. at 55-56, 484 N.E.2d at ll5-16. 
7 Id. at 56, 484 N.E.2d at ll6. 
8 Jd. at 57, 484 N.E.2d at ll6. 
9 /d. at 57-58, 484 N.E.2d at ll6-17. 
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of the statute, makes interpretation almost deliberately uncertain. In a 
case such as Fitzsimonds, precise and straightforward drafting might have 
resulted in a predictable and easily adjudicated outcome. 
§ 8.3. Nonconforming use: Notice of Decision. In Cappuccio v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals of Spencer, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court shed light on 
certain procedural aspects of chapter 40A, the Zoning Act. In Cappuccio, 
the plaintiffs owned a parcel of land known as Sherwood Beach. In 
February 1985, an intervenor filed a petition with the Spencer Zoning 
Board of Appeals, alleging that the plaintiffs' use of Sherwood Beach as 
a concert site was an extension of a nonconforming use. After a public 
hearing, at which the plaintiffs were present along with counsel, the board 
found that the plaintiffs' use did constitute an extension of a noncon-
forming use. The board filed its decision with the town clerk on April 
17, 1985, but failed to mail notice of the decision to the plaintiffs. 
On May 8, 1985, twenty-one days after the board filed its decision, the 
plaintiffs filed a complaint in superior court challenging the board's ruling. 
The sfiperior court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants, noting that chapter 40A, section 17, requires a person 
aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals to bring an action within 
twenty days after the decision has been filed with the town clerk. The 
plaintiffs had failed to meet this deadline. The plaintiffs appealed this 
ruling, asserting that under section 17, a ninety-day appeal period rather 
than a twenty-day period applied. Therefore, the board's failure to notify 
the plaintiffs violated the statute and denied the plaintiffs procedural due 
process. 2 The plaintiffs also appealed the superior court's ruling denying 
them leave to file an amended complaint, which would have added two 
requests for declaratory judgment. One sought a declaration as to whether 
the board's decision applied to the plaintiffs' existing nonconforming use 
of part of Sherwood Beach as a concert site. The other sought a decla-
ration that the board's decision was a nullity, owing to the alleged pre-
disposition of one of the board members against the plaintiffs. 
The defendants challenged the failure of notice argument contending 
that under chapter 40A, section 15, notice of the board's decision need 
§ 8.3. 1 398 Mass. 304, 496 N.E.2d 646 (1986). 
2 Section 17 further provides that the appeal within twenty days 
shall be exclusive, notwithstanding any defect of procedure or of notice other than 
notice by publication, mailing or posting as required by this chapter, and the validity 
of any action shall not be questioned for matters relating to defects in procedure or 
of notice in any other proceedings except with respect to such publication, mailing 
or posting and then only by a proceeding commenced within ninety days after the 
decision has been filed . . . . 
G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 
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only be mailed to the petitioner (the intervenor), abutters, and parties 
who request at the hearing that notice be mailed to them. 3 The defendants 
argued that plaintiffs fit none of these categories. Defendants further 
contended that the defect in notice for which section 17 provides a ninety-
day appeal period applies only to prior notice of a hearing. 
Upon direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court held that as 
owners of the property subject to the board's decision, the plaintiffs were 
entitled to have notice of the board's decision mailed to them.4 The Court 
reasoned that any other result would be absurd, and that the legislature 
surely intended "petitioners" to encompass the owner of the affected 
land. 5 The Court held, however, that the failure of the board to notify 
the plaintiffs of its decision was not the type of defect for which section 
17 provides a ninety-day appeal period. Agreeing with the defendants, 
the Court held that such defects are limited to defects of prior notice, as 
provided by chapter 40A, section 11.6 The Court added that the plaintiffs 
had not been denied procedural due process, because they were present 
at the hearing. The Court further noted that it was not unreasonable to 
require plaintiffs to inquire periodically of the town clerk regarding 
whether the board had filed its decision. 7 Finally, the Court uphe,d the 
superior court's denial of leave to file an amended complaint. They noted 
that the first claim for declaratory judgment, based on the applicability 
of the board's ruling to an existing nonconforming use, was a claim on 
the merits and therefore barred by section 17. The second claim con-
cerning predisposition of one of the board members was, according to 
the Court, insufficiently alleged. 8 
The Court correctly found that despite the plain language of the statute, 
and although the landowner was entitled to notice of the decision, the 
ninety-day appeal period applies only to errors at the hearing itself and 
not to post-hearing errors such as failure to mail notice. In Cappuccio, 
3 Section 15 provides that notice of the board's decision "shall be mailed forthwith to 
the petitioner, applicant or appellant, to the parties in interest designated in section eleven, 
and to every person present at the hearing who requested that notice be sent to him and 
stated the address to which such notice was to be sent." G.L. c. 40A, § 15. 
4 Cappuccio v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Spencer, 398 Mass. at 307-09, 496 N.E.2d 
at 648-49. 
5 !d. at 308-09, 496 N.E.2d at 649. This is another example of the drafting problems of 
chapter 40A. ~ 
6 The Court also noted that before the legislature amended the Zoning Act by St. 1975, 
c. 808, the appeal period for defects of notice was unlimited. Thus the ninety-day period 
provided in section 17 was designated not to extend the period of appeals on the merits, 
but to limit the period of appeals caused by defects of notice. Cappuccio, 398 Mass. at 
310, 496 N.E.2d at 649. 
7 /d. at 312-13, 496 N.E.2d at 651. 
8 /d. at 313-14, 496 N.E.2d at 652. 
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the plaintiffs were present at the hearing and had adequate time to prepare 
their case. Although the duty to inquire frequently of the clerk regarding 
the filing of the board's decision may impose upon those who desire 
notice by mail, such inquiry hardly seems any real burden on a landowner 
whose property is seriously affected by the decision. Although the Court 
concluded in Cappuccio that the failure to notify by mail did not amount 
to a deprivation of procedural due process and that the ninety-day appeal 
period did not apply to this type of error, "notice reasonably calculated" 
of the pendency of an action remains a fundamental requirement of due 
process. Because notice by mail best meets this requirement in most 
cases, it is unlikely that town and city clerks will use Cappuccio as an 
excuse not to mail notices of decisions to affected parties. 
§ 8.4. Dover Amendment and Licensing Power. Massachusetts is unique 
in having as a part of its zoning law the "Dover Amendment," a provision 
forbidding communities from excluding land uses for religious and edu-
cational purposes in any section of a city or town. 1 The extent of this 
provision was challenged in the 1985 Survey year in Newbury Junior 
College v. Town of Brookline. 2 In this case, Newbury sought a lodging 
house license to use two buildings it owned for dormitory purposes. The 
buildings had been owned by Cardinal Cushing College, which had in the 
past used them for dormitories. Prior to 1965, no lodging house permits 
had been necessary, but a statutory amendment adopted that year made 
all dormitories subject to the local licensing authority for lodging houses. 3 
The selectmen of Brookline denied this permit, basing their denial on 
what appeared to be the very general standard of community interest. 
They failed to view their authority as limited by more precise standards 
or by the effect Newbury's license would have under the Dover Amend-
ment. The trial court reversed the decision of the selectmen and, instead 
of remanding the case for further consideration, ordered the town to 
issue the permits. The judge found the denial of the permits unreasonable 
and arbitrary. The town appealed. 
The Appeals Court first noted that licensing authorities may exercise 
various levels of discretion in granting and denying licenses, depending 
upon the nature of the permit sought, the purpose of the relevant statute, 
and the language of the statute itself. As it noted, board discretion tends 
to be great in cases where moral depravity is at issue, whereas the board 
§ 8.4. 1 G.L. c. 40A, § 3. The latest form of this provision, adopted in 1975, does permit 
a group of reasonable physical restrictions on use. The language relevant to this chapter 
prohibits zoning that may "prohibit, regulate or restrict the use of land or structures for 
... educational purposes on land owned ... by a non-profit educational institution." 
2 19 Mass. App. Ct. 197, 472 N.E.2d 1373 (1985). 
3 G.L. c. 140, § 22. 
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has no discretion to deny other licenses once prescribed conditions are 
met. Lodging house licenses were initially authorized because of a fear 
that if not licensed they could foster immoral conduct, and thus should 
be subject to local control. The inclusion of dormitories under these 
provisions occurred, the court suggested, at a time of increased radical-
ism and disruption on college campuses, and greater tolerance in the 
dormitory environment for conduct traditionally deemed immoral. The 
court thus found sufficient support for the lower court's determination 
that the purpose of the. lodging house laws, in general and as applied to 
dormitories, was to assure that the housing would be orderly, law-abiding 
operations, and responsibly managed by appropriate persons, in addition 
to being safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation. The court further 
sustained this reading of the limits on the power of the selectmen by 
noting that chapter 140, section 30, which governs revocation of a lodging 
house license, cites unfitness of the licensee as grounds for revocation. 
Section 30 authorizes suspension for any cause deemed satisfactory to 
the selectmen, which is a substantially less drastic penalty than revoca-
tion. 
In Newbury, the selectmen's argument that the court's restrictive read-
ing would give them no authority not already available to them under 
building law and public nuisance abatement powers, was summarily re-
jected. The court stated that the licensing power triggers notice to the 
local authorities that they should monitor the premises. The court sub-
sequently noted that if the Brookline board "general interest" criterion 
were accepted, the town would be able to prevent the application of the 
Dover Amendment to this property. 
It is clear that the zoning law provision prevents the use of any zoning 
by-laws or ordinances that result in forbidding valid educational and 
religious institutional uses, although reasonable regulation is permitted. 
The town, and the neighbor intervenors, in Newbury, stressed that the 
licensing provisions operate independently of zoning, and are thus a 
parallel regulatory system. As they noted, regulation of wetlands4 has 
been held to operate independently of zoning. The court itself noted that 
the rejection of a license for a bowling alley was sustained, when the use 
was permitted under the zoning by-law,5 and reached a similar result 
when the selectmen refused a permit to store explosive and inflammable 
materials, despite a board of appeals' license to give the landowner a 
variance and a special permit for this purpose.6 
In Newbury, however, the denial of the licenses flatly contravened an 
4 Under G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
'Marchesi v. Selectmen of Winchester, 312 Mass. 52, 42 N.E.2d 817 (1942). 
6 E.A.D. Realty Corp. v. Selectmen of Shrewsbury, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 371 N.E.2d 
446 (1978). 
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express legislative purpose to permit educational uses on the locus. The 
town's reason for denying the license was quite clearly that the neighbors 
did not want an educational institution at this particular location. It is 
difficult to find a more blatant refusal to be bound by state law, or any 
possible policy argument that would reconcile statutory language in a 
manner that might permit this attempted indirect refusal to comport with 
a clear legislative mandate. 
The court also upheld the superior court's order to the town to issue 
the permits, rather than remand the case. It noted the problems that 
Newbury and its predecessor had already had in using this locus for 
educational purposes. Such a consistent obstruction of lawful use gave 
neither the trial court nor the Appeals Court any confidence in the po-
tential for fair adjudication by Brookline in handling this case on remand. 
Certainly those interested in zoning, and in the Dover Amendment, 
owe Brookline gratitude for its persistent attacks on the Amendment, 
since the cases arising from these actions have done much to clarify the 
breadth and limits of the exception. It may be little consolation to the 
town that it has indirectly provided instructions to Massachusetts prac-
titioners in its persistent efforts to repeal the Dover Amendment. Perhaps 
the Amendment itself may appropriately be limited by direct legislative 
action. No other states have such a broad exemption provision and this 
may suggest that some constriction might be feasible without any impor-
tant negative effects on religious and educational institutions. Unfortu-
nately, those who seek to attack this provision in the courts do not present 
themselves as unselfish proponents of the public weal, and thus create 
an environment that makes rational discussion of legislative alternatives 
difficult. 
§ 8.5. Exemption for Educational Purposes: Breadth of Coverage. One 
issue continually facing local zoning boards and the courts is the extent 
of the exemption from zoning restrictions given to institutions with 
claimed educational purposes. 1 The dispute arose again in Whitinsville 
Retirement Society v. Town of Northbridge,2 in a situation involving a 
mix of both educational and non-educational objectives. 
The plaintiff, owner of a nine acre tract of land in the defendant town, 
was granted a special permit in 1975 to use premises on the tract for 
housing, shelter and care of retired persons. The permit allowed eventual 
construction of additional buildings for these uses. Although the State 
Department of Community Affairs eventually granted a building permit 
in 1980 to build an independent living facility on the premises, several 
§ 8.5. I G.L. c. 40A, § 3. 
2 394 Mass. 757, 477 N.E.2d 407 (1985). 
9
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attempts by the plaintiff to add to its facilities, both before and after the 
1980 permit was granted, were denied on the grounds that a variance or 
special permit was required. The plaintiff's appeals from various town 
actions were denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and 
for failure to comply with the statutory time for appeal. Plaintiff brought 
this action in the land court under chapter 240, section 14A, and chapter 
185, section 10 112). 
The lower court found that the plaintiff's plan included programs where 
more able residents would assist less able residents; in addition to having 
individuals, both from within and outside the complex. aid the elderly 
residents by teaching them crafts. On this basis the land court found that 
bt;!cause the plaintiff was a non-profit institution performing an educa-
tional purpose it was exempt from the Northbridge zoning by-law. The 
Town of Northbridge appealed the land court's decision and the Supreme 
Judicial Court reversed. 
In its analysis, the Court noted that many activities of non-profit cor-
porations involve an element of education. Nevertheless when an excep-
tion is granted to an institution because of its educational purposes, these 
purposes must be its primary or at least fundamental effort. The land 
court in analyzing the work of the plaintiff, only found that there was 
"an element of education." Therefore, according to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, the land court's conclusion that the plaintiff was exempt was in 
error. The Court reasoned that the educational function of the retirement 
home was clearly secondary to the home's primary function of caring 
and providing for the elderly residents. 3 
The Court also noted that according to the provisions of chapter 240, 
section 14A and chapter 185, section G 112), the land court lacked juris-
diction to determine the validity of plaintiff's permit. According to the 
Court, the land court's jurisdiction is limited to determinations of the 
validity of its application to the plaintiff's land. 4 Because the land court 
only examined the extent of the plaintiff's 1975 permit and not the by-
law's validity or its application to the plaintiff's case, it had exceeded 
its jurisdiction. 5 
One can sympathize with the plaintiff's frustration resulting from the 
town's denial of its plan for expanded operations. Nevertheless, the 
3 For instances of facilities with mixed uses where educational purposes were found to 
be primary, see Fitchburg Housing Authority v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Fitchburg, 
380 Mass. 869, 874-75, 406 N.E.2d 1006 (1980), 1980 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 10.2, at 
396; Harbor Schools, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Haverhill, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 366 
N.E.2d 764 (1977). 
4 Whitinsville Retirement Society, Inc. ~ Town of Northbridge, 394 Mass. at 763, 477 
N.E.2d at 411. · 
5 /d. 
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plaintiff had had a prior opportunity to contest the by-law's validity, but 
failed to take timely action. Although the plaintiff's belated claim ques-
tioning the extent of its permit evoked sympathy because of the residents 
it served, it did not comport with the precedents and statutes of the 
Commonwealth and therefore, the land court's awarding of an exception 
was in error. 
§ 8.6. Zoning Exemption for Religious Use: Extent. In Southern New 
England Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Town of 
Burlington, the Seventh-Day Adventists Church Association, in 1978, 
purchased approximately two acres of land located in a residential district 
in the Town of Burlington. The land included a brook running through 
the middle of the property. The church planned to construct on the parcel 
a building with an adjoining parking lot. The church applied for a special 
construction permit, which was denied because the proposed use violated 
the town's wetlands by-law. A substantial part of the tract had been 
classified as wetlands under the town's amended zoning by-law, which 
superimposed a wetlands overlay district on the districts in the area. 1 
The town's by-law defined wetlands as all lands shown within the bound-
aries designated as wetlands on certain topographic sheets prepared in 
1977. These maps were made a part of the zoning by-law in 1979. 
In 1982, the church hired the engineering company which had prepared 
the original topographical sheets to resurvey the parcel. The firm con-
cluded that the original topographical sheets did not accurately depict 
the exact location and configuration of the '"existing brook' on the face 
of the earth." The firm recommended that the boundary line of the 
wetlands be relocated approximately 150 feet back from the front of the 
parcel toward the brook. A second plan was prepared and the church 
applied for placement of the wetlands boundary at the line established 
by the November, 1982 survey. The town refused to take any action on 
a town meeting article making this change, contrary to the recommen-
dation of both the planning board and conservation commission. The 
church filed this action in the land court pursuant to chapter 240, section 
14A and chapter 185, section 1 G 1/2).2 The church first sought a deter-
mination that it was exempt from the town's wetlands by-laws because 
it was a religious institution. 3 It further sought to invalidate the classifi-
cation of its land as wetlaqds. The land court held against the church on 
both issues and the church appealed. 
§ 8.6. 1 The wetlands illustrated on the topographic sheets were in accord with the 
Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
2 Southern New England Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Town of 
Burlington, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 490 N.E.2d 451 (1986). 
3 See G.L. c. 40A, § 3. 
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On appeal the church contended that the town lacked the power to 
adopt a zoning by-law that regulated the use of the land merely by 
designating the tract as wetlands. The church conceded, however, that 
the town may regulate the church lands by lawful wetlands restrictions 
adopted in the form of a general by-law rather than a zoning by-law.4 In 
its analysis, the Appeals Court reviewed the purposes of chapter 40A, 
section 3, and the Wetlands Protection Act and stated that the two 
statutes address differing, non-competing interests. According to the 
court, the religious exemption insures that religious denominational pref-
erences will not be established by a municipality5 and that religious uses 
can be placed at suitable sites in a municipality, subject only to reasonable 
dimensional regulations. 
The Wetlands Protection Act,6 in tum, does not govern particular land 
uses, but is, as the Appeals Court described it, "use-neutral." The Act 
has the broader purpose of protecting wetlands from developmental in-
trusion. Thus, under this wetlands legislation, the Agency of Wetlands 
Conservation or other similar districts may bar or appropriately restrict 
uses so that they are fully compatible with the area's wetland environ-
ment. The location and boundaries of wetland districts, according to the 
Appeals Court, are determined by the wetlands themselves and not by 
the use to which the tracts within them are to be used. The court em-
phasized that a municipality may establish more stringent controls than 
those established by state law and in proper cases may even "prohibit 
outright any disturbance of covered lands. "7 The court noted that a 
municipality has the authority to preserve its wetlands, either by means 
of the zoning power,8 or by means of its general legislative power.9 Thus, 
the Appeals Court held that as long as the dominant purpose of the local 
by-law is the proper protection of wetlands values, the form of regulation 
chosen does not matter. It also ruled that the legislature did not intend 
that section 3 of chapter 40A exempt a religious use from lawful wetlands 
control under a local zoning by-law, so long as the regulation has wetlands 
protection as its dominant purpose. 
In general, a wetlands zoning by-law will be held valid if there is a 
substantial relationship between it and the furtherance of any of the 
objectives of wetlands protection. 10 Thus the issue of whether the bound-
4 See Lovequist v. Conservation Commission of Dennis, 379 Mass. 7, 12, 393 N.E.2d 
858, 862 (1979). 
5 The Bible Speaks v. Board of Appeals of Lenox, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 33, 391 N.E.2d 
279, 286 (1979). 
6 G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
7 Lovequist, 379 Mass. at 15,393 N.E.2d at 863. 
8 Fogelman v. Chatham, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 588,446 N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (1983). 
9 See Lovequist, 379 Mass. at 12, 393 N.E.2d at 862. 
1° Fogelman, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 588, 446 N.E.2d at 1114. 
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ary established by the town's by-law is valid, as applied to the church's 
land, must be determined by examining whether the by-law has the 
required relationship with a reasonable purpose for wetlands protection. 
The court held that the facts and exhibits presented in Southern New 
England were insufficient to guide an informed decision regarding this 
question. Thus, attempting to decide whether the application of the wet-
lands boundary was lawful would require speculation resulting in preju-
dice to one party or the other. Nevertheless, according to the court, 
under chapter 240, section 14A and chapter 185, section 1 G 112), the 
church has the right to seek a determination of the validity of the by-law 
as applied to its land. Thus, the Appeals Court affirmed the first paragraph 
of the amended judgment and held the church may move in the land 
court to secure a determination of the validity of the wetlands by-law as 
applied to its land. 
The religious and educational exemption for local zoning regulation, 
except for certain dimensional limitations, applies only to zoning and not 
to other state, or state-authorized, legislation. Southern New England 
illustrates that certain policies may prevail over this exemption and can 
even be written into the zoning law of a community. Obviously the use 
of a state's non-zoning municipal power cannot be used as a charade or 
pretense to avoid the zoning law limitation.~' Nevertheless, the present 
case indicates the limits of this zoning protection when another critical 
public policy requires consideration. One can assume, of course, that 
such a public policy must be one of great weight and not one of merely 
public convenience or preference. Such a limitation is thus seldom likely 
to be found. 
§ 8. 7. Subdivision Control: Changes Affecting Landowners. During the 
1985 Survey year, the Appeals Court examined the validity of a planning 
board's approval of a subdivision plan. In Patelle v. Planning Board of 
Woburn, 1 the defendant planning board, acting under chapter 41, section 
81W, approved modifications to a subdivision plan. The modifications 
transformed a cul-de-sac into a through street, created house lots in 
previously open space areas, and changed the location of a particular 
open space. The plaintiff residents of the subdivision sought review of 
the planning board's approval of the plan, contending that the modifica-
tion adversely "affected" them and that, within the meaning ofthe statute, 
subdivision lot owners' and mortgagees' consents were required prior to 
approval of the subdivision modifications. 
11 Newbury Junior College v. Brookline, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 197, 472 N.E.2d 1373 (1985). 
See supra discussion, at § 8.4. 
§ 8.7. 1 20 Mass. App. Ct. 279, 480 N.E.2d 35 (1985). 
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Chapter 41, section 81 W permits a planning board to modify, amend 
or rescind its approval of a plan of a subdivision. 2 The issue thus was 
whether the planning board, exercising powers conferred under the stat-
ute, could approve the modifications as it did without the consent of the 
plaintiffs. The court held that it could, and affirmed the superior court's 
judgment for the defendants. 
In holding for the defendant planning board, the court reasoned that 
the word "affect" in the statute did not have the broad meaning that the 
plaintiffs ascribed to it. According to the court, the plaintiffs' complaints 
about noise and traffic as well as an unwanted backyard neighbor were 
matters with which the statute was unconcerned. Analyzing the legisla-
tive history, the court found that the legislature sought to guard against 
plan modifications that impaired the marketability of titles, and not those 
changes which have an indirect qualitative effect on persons owning 
property in the subdivision. 3 
The court properly pointed out that, even had the legislative history 
been less certain, the plaintiffs' contentions in this case would possibly 
paralyze or seriously hamper planning boards' powers to coordinate ways 
in a subdivision with other roads in the municipality, a duty the board 
has under chapter 41, section 81M. By construing "affect" to cover any 
type of impact, the statute would protect owners too broadly and severely 
limit the power of planning boards to regulate the local subdivision pro-
cess. The cost of limiting planning boards' power in exchange for unlim-
ited owner veto power is too great a cost to bear when decisions con-
cerning community planning are at stake. 
§ 8.8. Constructive Grant: Statutory Uncertainty. In two cases decided 
in 1985, both the Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court were 
faced with interpreting the semi-penetrable language of chapter 40A, 
section 15. In Zuckerman v. Board of Appeals of Greenfield, 1 the plaintiff 
sought a permit to erect a playground at his McDonald's franchise. The 
inspector denied the petition on the grounds that it would violate local 
zoning governing the placement of signs. On September 20, 1982, Zuck-
erman filed an appeal to the zoning board. A public hearing was held on 
2 G.L. c. 41, § 81W, states in relevant part, after empowering the planning board to 
modify, amend or rescind its approval of a particular subdivision plan: 
No modification, amendment or rescission of ... a plan ... [however] shall affect 
the lots in such subdivision which have been sold or mortgaged in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration subsequent to the approval of the plan, or any rights 
appurtenant thereto, without the consent of the owner of such lots, and of the holder 
of such mortgage or mortgages, if any, thereon. 
G.L. c. 41, § 8IW. 
3 Patelle v. Planning Board of Woburn, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 282, 480 N.E.2d at 38. 
§ 8.8. 1 394 Mass. 663, 477 N.E.2d 132 (1985). 
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November 18, 1982, and on that same date, the board voted to overrule 
the inspector yet subjected the grant to substantial limitations. On De-
cember 3, 1982, fifteen days after the board had made its decision, the 
board filed written copies of the decision with the town clerk. The statute 
requires that the decision be filed within fourteen days, but does not state 
from which point in time the fourteen day period commences. Zuckerman 
argued that under section 15, the failure to file within fourteen days 
following the date of the actual decision resulted in the constructive grant 
of the permit. The Court, however, held that the fourteen day period was 
directory, not mandatory. According to the Court, as long as the time 
from the filing of the application to the formal filing of the written decision 
did not exceed the seventy-five day period set out in paragraph 5 of 
section 15, there was no constructive grant of the permit. In Zuckerman, 
the board filed its decision seventy-four days after the appeal was filed 
thereby, under the Court's remedy of the statute, preventing a construc-
tive grant of the permit. The Court found that, even though the language 
is imperative in form, the time of filing does not go to the essence of the 
thing to be done and is only a regulation for orderly conduct of public 
business. 2 The Court distinguished Zuckerman from its decision in Ca-
pone v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Fitchburg, 3 where it held that there 
was a constructive grant when the board acted within seventy-five days 
but did not file its formal opinion for 110 days following the filing of the 
application. The Court found, in Capone, that such a delay could create 
the prospect of a perpetual cloud on the rights of a landowner to use his 
or her land. 
In 0' Kane v. Board of Appeals of Hingham, 4 the Appeals Court was 
similarly confronted with the task of interpreting section 15. In 0' Kane, 
the plaintiff sought a variance which was orally denied at the public 
hearing forty-one days after the filing of the application. The written 
decision was, however, filed thirty-five days later, or seventy-six days 
after the filing of the application. The question thus was whether the 
failure of the board of appeals to file its written decision within 75 days 
of the application's filing resulted in the constructive grant of the vari-
ance.5 
The Appeals Court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court had, after 
2 Zuckerman v. Board of Appeals of Greenfield, 394 Mass. at 667, 477 N .E.2d at 135. 
3 389 Mass. 617, 451 N.E.2d ll4l (1983). 
4 20 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 478 N.E.2d 962 (1985). 
5 Just as the Supreme Judicial Court had done in Zuckerman, the Appeals Court in 
O'Kane was forced to reconcile the seemingly conflicting provisions of chapter 40A, section 
15. which provides that a decision must be made within seventy-five days after the filing 
of an appeal and the requirement that the board file its decision within fourteen days from 
making its decision. 
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the superior court had rendered its decision in this case, held that the 
fourteen day period for filing the opinion was directory, not mandatory.6 
The Appeals Court relied on the Supreme Judicial Court's reasoning that 
as long as the filing was within seventy-five days of the application, there 
would be no constructive grant of the variance. Although the statute is 
not clear in its language, the Court read it to mean that the fourteen day 
filing requirement is not a factor in the analysis and should not shorten 
the seventy-five day period of the constructive grant. 
Justice Kaplan refined the Zuckerman analysis, finding that on the 
facts of 0' Kane, the actual period could be extended as long as seventy-
five days plus the fourteen days for filing the written decision, with the 
obvious requirement that the decision itself be made within the seventy-
five day period. As Justice Kaplan stated: "[w]e think this ... position 
accommodates better to the text and scheme of section 15, such as they 
are."7 
It is probably, at this point, fruitless to admonish the drafters of the 
Zoning Act regarding its language. Nevertheless, it is inexcusable for 
statutory language to be so uncertain in its meaning that simple questions, 
such as those in the present cases, are not resolvable from the text. If 
ever the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation should be mean-
ingful, it should be in a statute which sets specific times within which 
certain actions must be taken. 
§ 8.9. Historic District: Certificate of Appropriateness. In Anderson v. 
Old King's Highway Regional Historic District Commission, 1 the Sand-
wich Historic District Commission (local committee) denied the plaintiffs 
a certificate of appropriateness for the installation of vinyl clapboards 
over the painted shingles of an ell added one hundred years ago to a 
house that had been built in 1703. The house, owned by the plaintiffs, 
was located within the Old King's Highway Regional Historic District. 
The plaintiffs appealed the local committee's decision to the regional 
commission which similarly rejected the plaintiffs' claim and affirmed the 
local committee's decision. The plaintiffs then appealed to the district 
court which found facts and concluded that the committee should have 
issued a certificate of appropriateness. The Appellate Division of the 
district court reversed the trial judge's decision, and the plaintiffs then 
sought review by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The local committee denied the certificate of appropriateness based on 
the following contentions: the application involved a house of substantial 
6 See Zuckerman, 394 Mass. at 667, 477 N.E.2d at 135. 
7 O'Kane v. Board of Appeals of Hingham, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 164, 478 N.E.2d at 964. 
§ 8.9. 1 397 Mass. 609, 493 N.E.2d 188 (1986). 
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historic significance in an important part of the historic district; the 
plaintiffs applied vinyl siding to the rear of the house without the com-
mittee's permission even though they had notice of the regional commis-
sion's guidelines pointing to the problem of installing vinyl siding on old 
houses; there would be no hardship to the plaintiffs in denying the ap-
plication because there were reasonable alternatives to vinyl clapboards; 
and a detrimental precedent would be set by allowing the plaintiffs to 
change the siding in the ell from shingles to clapboards.2 On appeal, the 
regional commission did not exercise its own independent judgment of 
the facts and reviewed the local committee's decision only with an eye 
towards determining error. The commission concluded that the local 
committee's decision had a reasonable, factual basis and thus, it acted 
appropriately. The district court judge, however, elaborated upon the 
local committee's fact finding and further found that only a trained eye 
at close range could distinguish vinyl clapboards from wooden clap-
boards. Hence, the judge concluded on this ground that the architectural 
change undertaken by the plaintiffs was not inappropriate. To that con-
clusion, the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and affirmed the decision 
of the Appellate Division. 
The Court held that the district court's conclusion that only the trained 
eye at close range could distinguish vinyl clapboards from wooden clap-
boards was not an appropriate standard because the facts involved re-
placing painted wooden shingles with vinyl clapboards. The Court noted 
that the district court judge's standard of "obviousness to the 'untrained 
eye'" was a suspect reading of the measure of appropriateness under the 
statute.3 According to the Court, even if the judge's reliance on the 
"untrained eye" standard were correct, it is unhelpful because both the 
trained and the untrained eye can differentiate between vinyl siding and 
painted wooden clapboards. 4 
The Court, in its decision, examined the standards of review used by 
the regional commission, district court, appellate division of the district 
court, and the Court itself. According to the Court, the authorizing statute 
identifies the appropriate standard with reasonable precision. 5 Clearly the 
2 Anderson v. Old King's Hwy. Regional Historic District Comm., 397 Mass. at 612, 493 
N.E.2d at 191. 
3 St. 1973, c. 40, § 10, as amended states: "The committee shall not make any recom-
mendations or requirements except for the purpose of preventing changes in exterior 
architectural features obviously incongruous to the purposes set forth in the act." 
4 Anderson, 397 Mass. at 613, 493 N.E.2d at 191-92. 
5 G.L. c. 40c, §§ 7, 10(a), (g); St. 1973, c. 470, §§ 6, 8, 10 as amended; St. 1<)75, c. 845, 
§ 13. The Court noted, 397 Mass. at 6ll n.4, 493 N.E.2d at 191 n.4, that the district court 
record made under St. 1976, c. 845, § 13 is unsatisfactory for a fully adequate review. 
According to the Court, the procedure requires a report of the evidence but not of the 
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local committee's decision only was required to meet a standard that it 
was not in excess of its authority, was not an exercise of poor judgment, 
and was not arbitrary, capricious or erroneous.6 
Although Anderson arose under a special historic district statute rather 
than the Historic District Act,7 the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion 
clarifies the standards that must be applied in reviewing local committee 
action. As the Court noted, the standard of review by the district court 
under the act is the same as that governing the granting or denial of 
special permits under local zoning regulations. The line of decisions cited 
by the Court in Anderson provides extensive guidelines regarding the 
appropriate standard of review. 
§ 8.10. Minimum Lot Size: Grandfathering. At issue in Baldiga v. 
Board of Appeals of Uxbridge 1 was the interpretation of another loosely 
drafted provision of the Zoning Act, in this case chapter 40A, section 6. 
Section 6 provides grandfather clause exemptions for minimum size in-
creases to lots for single-family homes. 2 
On November 14, 1979, the plaintiff, as sole trustee of a realty trust, 
purchased a parcel of land comprising three lots in an area of Uxbridge 
zoned for agricultural use. Baldiga purchased these lots with the intention 
of erecting single-family homes upon them. Under the zoning by-law in 
findings of the district judge. Thus the Court left open whether errors of law not arising 
from denials of requests for rulings could be appealed. 
6 Anderson, 397 Mass. at 611, 493 N.E.2d at 191 (citing Gumley v. Selectmen of Nan-
tucket, 371 Mass. 718, 723-24, 358 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (1977)). 
7 G.L. c. 40C. 
§ 8.10. 1 395 Mass. 829,482 N.E.2d 809 (1985). 
2 G.L. c. 40A, § 6, provides in relevant part: 
Any increase in area, frontage, width, yard, or depth requirements of a zoning 
ordinance or by-law shall not apply to a lot for single and two family residential use 
which at the time of recording or endorsement, whichever occurs sooner was not 
held in common ownership with any adjoining land, conformed to then existing 
requirements and had less than the proposed requirement but at least five thousand 
square feet of area and fifty feet of frontage. Any increase in area, frontage, width, 
yard or depth requirement of a zoning ordinance or by-law shall not apply for a 
period of five years from its effective date or for five years after January first, 
nineteen hundred and seventy-six, whichever is later, to a lot for single and two 
family residential use, provided the plan for such lot was held in common ownership 
with an[y] adjoining land and conformed to the existing zoning requirements as of 
January first, nineteen hundred and seventy-six, and had less area, frontage, width, 
yard or depth requirements than the newly effective zoning requirements but con-
tained at least seven thousand five hundred square feet of area and seventy-five feet 
of frontage, and provided that said year period does not commence prior to January 
first, nineteen hundred and seventy-six, and provided further that the provisions of 
this sentence 'shall not apply to more than three of such adjoining lots held in common 
ownership (emphasis added). 
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effect at that time, single-family homes could be constructed in agricul-
tural zones provided the lots had a minimum frontage of 200 feet and a 
minimum area of one acre. All three lots met both requirements. 
On May 13, 1980, the town amended its zoning by-law to require a 
minimum frontage of 300 feet and a minimum lot size of 2 acres for the 
constructioh of single-family homes in an agricultural zone. This amend-
ment became effective on May 20, 1980. 
In October 1983, the plaintiff applied for building permits to build 
single-family residences on the lots, and the town building inspector 
denied the applications. The plaintiff then appealed the inspector's de-
cision to the town board of appeals, which denied the appeal on the 
grounds that the lots did not meet the requirements established by the 
1980 amendment. 
The plaintiff then brought an action in superior court, arguing that his 
application met all the requirements for a grandfather exemption set forth 
in the second sentence of section 6; to wit, that five years had not elapsed 
since the effective date of the zoning amendment, that each lot had been 
recorded or endorsed before the zoning amendment, that each lot was 
held in common ownership with adjoining land, and that the lots con-
formed to the existing zoning requirements as of January 1, 1976.3 Thus, 
Baldiga had to have recorded a plan, each lot had to be held in common 
ownership with an adjoining lot and the lots had to conform with zoning 
requirements existing as of January 1, 1976. The town argued that be-
cause Baldiga had recorded his plan after the 1976 Act, although before 
the zoning amendment of 1980, he was not entitled to an exemption. 4 
Upon motions for summary judgment, the superior court held for the 
plaintiff and ordered the permit to issue, noting that the town's interpre-
tation of section 6 was inconsistent with principles of statutory construc-
tion and tended to undermine expressed legislative intent. 5 
On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the 
superior court. Examining the statute closely, the Court noted that the 
town's attempt to modify the entire second part of the second sentence 
of section 6 with the phrase "as of January 1, 1976" violated "the general 
rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying 
clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the 
subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpre-
tation. "6 The Court further noted that the town's interpretation of the 
statute would largely negate the provision which exempts a single-family 
3 Baldiga v. Board of Appeals of Uxbridge, 395 Mass. at 832, 482 N .E.2d at 811. 
4 /d. 
5 !d. at 833-34, 482 N.E.2d at 812. 
6 !d. at 833, 482 N.E.2d at 811 (quoting Moulton v. Brookline Rent Control Bd., 385 
Mass. 228, 230-31,431 N.E.2d 225, 227 (1982)). 
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lot for five years after January 1, 1976, whichever is later.7 The Supreme 
Judicial Court also agreed with the superior court's observation that the 
legislature intended the statute to have "continuing applicability," which 
it could only have under the plaintiff's interpretation.8 
The town also argued on appeal that the plaintiff's interpretation of 
section 6 would permit "checkerboarding" as a means of aV'oiding com-
pliance with local zoning requirements.9 The Court described checker-
boarding as a practice in which a landowner divides a large parcel of land 
among two or more straws so that no one holds two contiguous lots. 10 
The town argued that permitting this practice frustrated the purpose of 
chapter 40A, which is to facilitate exercise of the zoning power by 
municipalities. Although the Court did not controvert this assertion, it 
nevertheless rejected the argument, noting that the specific purpose of 
the second sentence of section 6, as enacted by St. 1979, c. 106, was "to 
grant grandfather rights to owners of certain lots of land."" 
Baldiga settles an issue that has been debated since Chapter 40A, 
section 6 was adopted. Clearly the result accords with the general purpose 
of this section since the town's interpretation would destroy the concept 
of grandfathering in many situations to which it, at least under the prior 
law, would apply. Furthermore, if the legislature had intended such a 
major change, it. would have likely stated so with some precision. 
§ 8.11. Lot Size: Authorization of Special Permits for Existing Struc-
tures. In Wizansky v. Board of Appeals of Brookline,' the Appeals Court 
reviewed the grant of a special permit for the construction of a narrow 
driveway adjacent to a property line. The plaintiff's neighbors, the Wil-
liams, owned a home in a densely settled area of Brookline. They had 
no driveway, which required Mrs. Williams, a nurse, to park two blocks 
away from her home following her midnight shift so as to comply with 
Brookline's overnight parking ban. Furthermore, the Williams' lack of 
driveway space also required the Williams' tenant, a handicapped indi-
vidual, to park on the street at night. 2 
The Williams' sideyards were 8.00 to 8.65 feet on the left side of their 
house, and nine feet or slightly more on the right. The Williams could 
7 /d. at 833, 482 N.E.2d at 812. 
8 /d. 
9Jd. 
10 /d. at 834 n.4, 482 N.E.2d at 812 n.4. 
11 /d. at 834, 482 N.E.2d at 812. 
§ 8.11. 1 21 Mass. App. Ct. 915, 484 N.E.2d 1025 (1985). 
2 The tenant owned a car with handicapped driver plates thus exempting him from 
Brookline's overnight parking ban. /d. 
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not therefore meet the requirements set forth in Brookline's zoning by-
law for offstreet parking. The by-law, however, authorized special per-
mits for the construction of new parking facilities for existing structures 
where offstreet parking would have been required for a new structure. 
Therefore, after a determination that the right side of the Williams' house, 
nearer the Wizanskys, was the preferable side for a driveway, owing to 
slightly greater width and less exposure to the street, the board granted 
a special permit to construct a two-car driveway on that side. The board 
also required the Williams' tenant to park his car in the driveway. 
The Wizanskys thereupon brought an action in superior court chal-
lenging the board's decision. The judge upheld the board, and the Wi-
zanskys appealed. Before the Appeals Court, the Wizanskys argued that 
the board had not made sufficient findings of fact to justify the grant of 
a special permit. While the court agreed that in particular cases more 
extensive findings were needed to justify zoning relief, it noted that this 
case did not rise to that level of complexity.3 In affirming the superior 
court, the Appeals Court also rejected a number of arguments that the 
Wizanskys raised within the context of Brookline's parking by-laws, 
remarking that none of the provisions cited were intended to apply to 
the Williams' situation. 4 The Appeals Court concluded that based on the 
evidence presented to the board, the board's decision was rational and 
non-arbitrary. 
Wizansky illustrates the important function of the interim appellate 
level existing in the Massachusetts judiciary. In an instance, such as this, 
where simple facts have given rise to an elaborate appeal process, it is 
necessary that there be a court that can efficiently resolve a dispute. By 
declining to remand the case back to the district court and simultaneously 
incorporating its own order, the Wizansky court provides a nice example 
of an intermediate appellate court effectively performing its essential 
"gate-keeping" function. 
3 Wizansky v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 916, 484 N.E.2d at 
1027. The Appeals Court noted that although the superior court judge should have made 
his own findings of fact rather than incorporating those made by the board, no purpose 
could be served by remanding this case for express findings.ld. at 916,484 N.E.2d at 1026. 
4 I d. According to the court, the board's findings adequately met the general requirements 
for granting special permits. ld. Regarding the plaintiff's more specific contention, the 
court quickly dismissed the plaintiff's argument that under section 6.13(b)(6), the defen-
dants were required to devote twenty-five percent of the space to compact car parking. 
According to the court, clearly this requirement applied to parking lots divided into marked 
spaces and not to the spaces in the present case. In contrast, the court agreed with the 
plaintiff's desire to be protected by section 6.13(1), requiring a fence or shrubbery to 
prevent trespass or headlamp glare. Accordingly, the court ordered a modification to the 
special permit. Id. 
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§ 8.12. Variance: Need to Show True "Hardship." In Martin v. Board 
of Appeals of Yarmouth, 1 the Appeals Court considered an instance 
where a board acted outside its authority. The Martins and Patrick Mar-
asco were owners of adjoining properties in Yarmouth. Between their 
parcels ran a private way, created as part of a subdivision in 1965, which 
provided frontage to Marasco's lot, and to several new lots then created. 
At the time of the subdivision, Marasco's garage encroached four feet 
on the private way, and it was a condition of subdivision approval that 
the garage be moved or removed. 
In 1983, Marasco demolished his old garage and applied for zoning 
relief to build a new one within six and a half feet of the way. Although 
the zoning ordinance applicable when the action was brought and prior 
to the 1965 subdivision required offsets of thirty feet, the board granted 
Marasco a variance from the requirement because of the "desirability" 
of avoiding harm to ancient oak trees. The board granted Marasco both 
a special permit and a variance to build his garage, and the Martins 
sought review of this decision in superior court. The superior court found 
that the board had not exceeded its authority and the Martins appealed. 
In reversing the superior court and annulling the decision of the board, 
the Appeals Court noted that the board lacked the authority to grant 
Marasco either a special permit or a variance. The court reasoned that 
because Marasco had voluntarily subdivided his property in 1965, he had 
created an unprotected, unlawful non-conforming use. Therefore, the by-
law which authorized special permits for the extension or alteration of a 
non-conforming use was inapplicable to Marasco's situation.2 Moreover, 
the court noted that the board lacked the authority to grant a variance 
because Marasco had not shown a hardship. In this regard, the court 
disapproved of the board's finding that it was desirable to locate the 
garage near the road because of "ancient oaks" elsewhere on the prop-
erty. The court noted that mere desirability does not rise to the level of 
a hardship, and ruled that even without this consideration, it was apparent 
from the plan and photographs that the garage could be located elsewhere 
on Marasco's property without disturbing major trees, and still comply 
with the thirty-foot setback provision in the by-laws.3 
Martin demonstrates that the Massachusetts courts will show little 
tolerance for individuals who seek variances merely because of perceived 
inconvenience. The Appeals Court, in Martin, made it quite clear that 
true "hardship" must be demonstrated before a variance will be granted. 
As a policy matter, this rationale comports with general notions favoring 
effective and comprehensive subdivision planning. 
§ 8.12. ' 20 Mass. App. Ct. 972, 482 N .E.2d 336 (1985). 
2 Martin v. Board of Appeals of Yarmouth, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 973,482 N.E.2d at 337. 
3 /d. 
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§ 8.13. Variance: Constructive Grant. In DiGiovanni v. Board of Ap-
peals of Rockport, 1 the Appeals Court cast stronger light on the proper 
procedures for appealing denials of zoning relief. In 1978, the plaintiff, 
as sole owner of a residential development company, sought and obtained 
from the defendant board of appeals a variance to construct a "cluster" 
development at Rowe's Point in Rockport. The variance referred specif-
ically to plans submitted to and on file with the board. In 1980, Di-
Giovanni modified these plans, and although he brought the modified 
plans with him to subsequent meetings with the board, he admitted that 
he never specifically highlighted the changes. The Rockport building 
inspector later issued foundation and building permits on the basis of the 
1980 plans. After DiGiovanni's project had commenced, the building 
inspector issued a stop-work order, noting that DiGiovanni's construction 
was not in accordance with the 1978 plans. The order also indicated that 
DiGiovanni could request a modification of the 1978 variance or appeal 
the stop-work order to the board pursuant to chapter 40A, section 15. 
On February 12, 1982, DiGiovanni filed an application with the town 
clerk requesting unspecified further relief from the board of appeals. 
DiGiovanni did not attach the stop-work order, a prerequisite for appeal 
thereof. Shortly afterward, on February 22, 1982, DiGiovanni met infor-
mally with the board and argued that he was in substantial compliance 
with the 1978 variance. The board disagreed, however, indicating that a 
public hearing and modification of the variance would be required. On 
March 5, 1982, DiGiovanni'therefore filed a second application with the 
town clerk, this time specifying that he sought modification of the 1978 
variance. The fate of the original application was unclear even at trial. 
Although the town clerk maintained that he returned the original appli-
cation to DiGiovanni when DiGiovanni submitted the second application, 
DiGiovanni himself had no such recollection. 
Pursuant to the second application, the board held a hearing on March 
30, 1982, at which DiGiovanni's attorney indicated that his client was 
seeking a modification of the 1978 variance. On May 12, 1982, the board 
filed its decision, granting some relief to the petitioner, but denying 
several of his other requests. 
DiGiovanni then brought an action against the board in district court, 
pursuant to chapter 40A, section 17. The district court judge found that 
DiGiovanni's application of February 12, 1982, was an appeal of the stop-
work order, and that the appeal was constructively granted because the 
board had failed to act within the statutory period established by chapter 
40A, section 15. The district court's finding included a factual determi-
nation that DiGiovanni had not withdrawn his first application. The judge 
§ 8.13. 1 19 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 474 N.E.2d 198 (1985). 
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also found that, had DiGiovanni sought modification of the 1978 variance 
in his original application, he would be entitled to modification as a matter 
of right. Nevertheless, in any case, according to the judge, DiGiovanni 
was not bound by the 1978 variance to follow the 1978 plans exactly. 
The judge further noted that the town was estopped to contest changes 
in setback resulting from the town conservation commission's mandate. 
Finally, the district court found that the changes embodied in the 1980 
plans were insubstantial, and available to the board for review, if not 
impliedly approved, in 1980.2 Accordingly, the district court vacated the 
stop-work order, declared DiGiovanni's second application null and va-
cated the board's ruling as "arbitrary and not supported by fact and 
law."3 The board appealed. 
In reversing the district court, the Appeals Court noted that because 
DiGiovanni had not appealed the stop-work order, neither the board of 
appeals nor the district court had the authority to violate the order. The 
Appeals Court reasoned that despite the patent ambiguity of DiGiovanni's 
original application, all parties concerned, including DiGiovanni himself, 
understood the February 12 application to be a petition for modification 
of the 1978 variance. 4 The Appeals Court also pointed out that had 
DiGiovanni sought review of the stop-work order, he had failed to follow 
the proper procedure set forth in chapter 40A, section 15, requiring the 
petitioner to specify the grounds for the appeal. 5 Moreover, the court 
noted that this same lack of specificity prevented constructive relief from 
the stop-work order, because the application did not ~liege sufficient facts 
to enable the board to grant relief.6 Finally, the Appeals Court overturned 
the district court's finding of fact concerning the fate of DiGiovanni's 
original application, and found that the plaintiff had voluntarily with-
drawn this document. 7 
The Appeals Court similarly reversed the district court's finding that 
the board's decision of May 12, 1982, was arbitrary and not supported 
by fact and law. The court initially remarked that it is "axiomatic that 
when a variance is granted for a project 'as shown by ... plans' that on 
their face give no indication that they are preliminary plans, the variance 
requires strict compliance with the plans, at least as far as the site location 
and the bulk of buildings are concerned."8 Having determined, therefore, 
2 DiGiovanni v. Board of Appeals of Rockport, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 342, 474 N .E.2d at 
202. 
3 /d. at 343, 474 N.E.2d at 202. 
4 /d. at 343-44, 474 N.E.2d at 202-03. 
'ld. at 344, 474 N.E.2d at 203. 
6 /d. at 345, 474 N.E.2d at 203. 
7 /d. at 345-46 n.ll, 474 N .E.2d at 204 n.ll. 
8 ld. at 346-47, 474 N.E.2d at 204. 
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that the board properly required DiGiovanni to seek modification to the 
1978 variance, the court considered whether the board had appropriately 
denied relief. 
In reversing the district court, the Appeals Court noted that neither 
the hardships that occasioned the 1978 variance nor those supposedly 
mandated by the town conservation commission compelled the board to 
modify DiGiovanni's variance. The court noted that the 1978 variance 
putatively extinguished the hardships that occasioned it, and that if the 
conservation commission had created new hardships, which fact the court 
did not wholly credit,9 it was nevertheless the board's province, and not 
DiGiovanni's, to grant a second variance. 10 The court noted that Di-
Giovanni's real hardship was that he had built substantially before seek-
ing zoning relief, and this was "not the type of hardship that justifies a 
variance. "11 
The Appeals Court concluded that a trial judge may annul a decision 
of the board of appeals only upon a finding that the board acted in excess 
of its authority. This finding, however, can only occur when "the variance 
has been denied solely on a legally untenable ground, or when the deci-
sion is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary."12 Barring such 
a finding, the Appeals Court remarked that a trial judge may not consider 
whether the board ought to have granted a variance. Because in this case 
the board found no hardship justifying modification of the 1978 variance, 
the district court erred in nullifying the board's decision as being in excess 
of its authority. 13 
§ 8.14. Variance: Time of Exercise. In Hogan v. Hayes, 1 the Appeals 
Court considered time limitations upon the exercise of zoning variances 
under the Zoning Act and its predecessor, the Zoning Enabling Act. The 
plaintiffs and defendants were owners of adjacent lots that had previously 
constituted a single lot. The two parcels had frontage on a private way. 
The plaintiffs' lot contained a house and a garage, and the defendant's 
lot was unimproved. In April 1974, the plaintiffs' and defendants' lots 
were both unimproved. In that month, the plantiffs' and defendants' 
common predecessor in title, Margaret Stanton, a widow living in the 
house ultimately owned by the plaintiff, applied for a variance to subdi-
vide her property and build a smaller house on the vacant half of her lot. 
9 /d. at 349 n.17, 474 N.E.2d at 205 n.l7. 
10 Jd. at 349, 474 N.E.2d at 205. 
11 /d. at 349, 474 N.E.2d at 205-06. 
12 /d. at 349, 474 N.E.2d at 206 (quoting Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 
331 Mass. 557, 559-60, 120 N.E.2d 916, 919 (1954)). 
13 /d. at 349, 474 N.E.2d at 206. 
§ 8.14. 1 19 Mass. App. Ct. 399, 474 N.E.2d 1158 (1985). 
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Stanton sought the variance because neither lot resulting from this sub-
division met minimum lot size, width, frontage, or offset requirements 
applicable under the city zoning ordinance. Citing the substantial hard-
ship Stanton would suffer if denied relief, the board issued a variance. 
Stanton did not at the time request approval under or relief from the 
Subdivision Control Law. 
In 1975, Stanton sold the lot with the house and garage to the plaintiff's 
predecessor in title, leaving the other lot vacant. Subsequently, the de-
fendants purchased the unimproved lot, and on December 14, 1982, 
shortly after they had obtained the property, applied for a building permit 
to build a single-family dwelling. The permit issued on January 14, 1983 
and on April 7, 1983, the planning board gave the defendants an endorse-
ment of "approval not required" under the Subdivision Control Law. 
On January 24, 1983, the plaintiffs filed a written protest with the 
building inspector concerning the defendants' permit, and one week later, 
they brought an action in superior court challenging the building permit, 
joining as defendants the Hayes, the building inspector, the board of 
appeals, and the planning board. Subsequently, and in the absence of a 
response by the building inspector to their January 24, 1983 protest, the 
plaintiffs took an administrative appeal ofthe defendants' building permit 
to the board of appeals. On June 24, 1983, the board of appeals upheld 
the issuance of the permit, noting that the plaintiff's action, already 
commenced in superior court, would resolve the issue. Plaintiffs there-
upon filed a second action in superior court on July 12, 1983, reiterating 
arguments made in the original action, and also making specific reference 
to the board's ruling of June 24, 1983. The two actions were consolidated. 
Upon motions for summary judgment, the superior court held for the 
defendants on all aspects of the claim, and the plaintiffs appealed. 
The Appeals Court initially noted that under chapter 40A, sections 7 
and 8, the plaintiffs could not technically seek administrative or judicial 
review of a building permit until after receiving a written response to 
their protest from the building inspector. Observing, however, that the 
defendants had not raised this issue, and that it was not necessary for 
the court to raise it sua sponte, the court proceeded to consider the case 
on the merits. 2 
The thrust of plaintiffs' argument was that Stanton's variance, permit-
ting the construction of a dwelling on the vacant lot, had lapsed over the 
approximately nine years that separated the grant of the variance from 
the issuance of the defendants' building permit. As authority, the plain-
tiffs cited the Zoning Act, chapter 40A, section 10, which, although not 
effective in Quincy at the time Stanton's variance was granted, provides 
2 Hogan v. Hayes, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 402-03, 474 N.E.2d at 1160-61. 
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that variances lapse unless exercised within one year. 3 In finding for the 
defendants, however, the court emphasized that the Zoning Act has no 
set applicability to matters arising before its effective date. 4 Nevertheless, 
because Stanton subdivided her property within a year of the grant, she 
sufficiently and irrevocably exercised her rights, thereby making it un-
necessary for the court to reach this issue. 5 The court additionally took 
notice of the fundamental inequity of the plaintiff's argument that the 
defendants should not benefit from the same variance that permitted 
creation of the plaintiffs' own lot. 6 
Nevertheless, because the Quincy building inspector had issued the 
defendant's building permit before the planning board had held that ap-
proval was not required under the Subdivision Control Law, the Appeals 
Court was unable to affirm the superior court's ruling. The inspector's 
premature action resulted in a procedural irregularity in violation of the 
Subdivision Control Law, chapter 41, section SlY. Accordingly, the Ap-
peals Court granted leave to the defendants to supplement their pleading 
and proof to show compliance with this provision. 7 
§ 8.15. Variance: Tenant's Standing to Challenge. In Quimby v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Arlington, 1 the Appeals Court addressed whether a 
residential neighboring tenant, living approximately fifty feet from a res-
taurant that had obtained a parking variance, was a proper party to 
dispute such a grant. Quimby brought suit on her own behalf under 
chapter 40A, section 17 following the grant of a variance by the zoning 
board of appeals. Upon a motion by an individual defendant, the superior 
court dismissed the claim, noting that plaintiff lacked standing. Plaintiff 
thereupon moved to amend her complaint, adding as a co-plaintiff her 
parents, who owned the residence. The superior court summarily denied 
the motion to amend and plaintiff appealed. 
In a rescript opinion reversing the superior court, the Appeals Court 
observed that the issue of whether a tenant has standing to challenge a 
zoning variance is a difficult one, and depends upon a number of consid-
erations. In its analysis, the court enumerated the following factors as 
pertinent to the determination: "whether the applicant is in control of the 
3 Id. at 403,474 N.E.2d at 1160-61. G.L. c. 40A, § 10, as amehded by St. 1977, c. 829, 
§ 4B provides: "If the rights authorized by a variance are not exercised within one year of 
the date of grant of such variance they shall lapse, and may be reestablished only after 
notice and a new hearing pursuant to this section." Hogan, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 403 n.10, 
474 N .E.2d at 1161 n.IO. 
4 Id. at 403, 474 N.E.2d at 1161. 
5 Id. at 404, 474 N.E.2d at 1161. 
6 Jd. at 404, 474 N.E.2d at 1161-62. 
7 Id. at 405, 474 N.E.2d at 1162. 
§ 8.15. ' 19 Mass. App. Ct. 1005, 476 N.E.2d 241 (1985). 
27
Huber: Chapter 8: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1986
272 1986 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 8.16 
property, whether she is in possession or has a present or future right to 
possession, whether the use applied for is consistent with the applicant's 
interest in the same property, and the extent of the interest of other 
persons in the same property."2 Noting that "factual nuances" would 
determine the issue of plaintiff's standing and thus, could only be re-
solved at trial, the court concluded that the motion to dismiss should not 
have been granted. 3 
The Appeals Court was sharply critical of the superior court's denial 
of plaintiff's motion to amend. The court noted that, absent a demon-
stration of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, such motions should be 
granted liberally. The court emphasized that the mere fact that the original 
plaintiff may have lacked standing did not justify denying a motion to 
amend the complaint and substitute parties who did have standing.4 
Tenants have not traditionally had standing to attack zoning and vari-
ations therein. The conventional view has been that the tenant's interest 
is short-term and derivative, and thus the landowner should be the one 
to act, because her interest is presumed to be affected in a more per-
manent way. The Appeals Court opinion, requiring reconsideration on 
the denial of the plaintiff's motion to amend, reflects a more intelligent 
view of the possible impact of zoning change on a tenant. 
§ 8.16. Taking: Performance By Commonwealth of Private Landowner's 
Duty to Abate Nuisance. In Nassr v. Commonwealth, 1 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court distinguished an eminent domain taking from a temporary 
trespass for the purpose of eliminating a public nuisance. The plaintiff, 
Rena Nassr, owned a parcel of land in Freetown, which she leased to 
co-plaintiff San-Man Corp.2 In 1978, San-Man rented a section of a 
warehouse it maintained on the premises to Harold Matthews, who did 
business as H.G.M. Drum Co., Inc. 3 In April1979, employees or agents 
of Matthews were discovered dumping liquid on the ground a short 
distance from the building. Further investigation by Federal, state, and 
local officials revealed a "lagoon" of volatile organic materials at the site, 
along with approximately 750 barrels of liquid material in the warehouse, 
some of which were leaking. 4 This unlicensed hazardous waste operation 
2 Quimby v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Arlington, at 1006, 476 N.E.2d at 242 (quoting 
Richards v. Planning & Zoning Comm. of Wilton, 170 Conn. 318, 323, 365 A.2d 1130, 1133 
(1976)). 
3 /d. at 1006, 476 N.E.2d at 242. 
4 /d. at 1007, 476 N.E.2d at 242-43. 
§ 8.16. 1 394 Mass. 767, 477 N.E.2d 987 (1985). 
2 Nassr v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. at 768, 477 N.E.2d at 989. 
3 /d. 
• /d. at 769, 477 N.E.id at 989. 
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posed a risk of ground-water contamination, accidental on-site ignition, 
and potentially serious bodily harm.5 
After the discovery of Matthews' operation, state officials padlocked 
his section of the warehouse, posted a security guard on the premises, 
and, with permission from the owners, began extensive cleanup opera-
tions.6 The state did not indicate any intent to charge for its services.7 
The cleanup lasted until October 1980, during which time the plaintiffs 
were unable to rent Matthews' section of the warehouse. 8 
The plaintiffs, Rena Nassr and San-Man Corp., brought an action in 
superior court seeking damages flowing from an alleged government tres-
pass on their property.9 The Commonwealth thereupon countersued ar-
guing under both statutory and common law lines that it ought to be 
reimbursed for the costs of the cleanup. 10 In a non-jury trial, the superior 
court held that the state had not trespassed, because it had a "right and 
duty to abate the nuisance" on the land. 11 The judge also found, however, 
that the Commonwealth was not entitled to restitution under any of 
several statutory and common law theories. 12 All parties appealed, and 
the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review. 
The plaintiffs re-argued their trespass claim as an uncompensated tak-
ing, contending that the Commonwealth had deprived them of rent for 
Matthews' section of the warehouse from April1979 until October 1980. 13 
Observing that the plaintiffs had made no effort to clean up the site 
themselves, however, and that until cleaned up the property was unfit to 
5 ld. 
6 Id. at 769, 477 N.E.2d at 990. 
7 I d. at 770, 477 N .E.2d at 990. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 768, 477 N.E.2d at 989. The Commonwealth also named as a third-party defen-
dant Alfred Nassr, Rena Nassr's husband. /d. 
11 Id. at 770, 477 N.E.2d at 990. See G.L. c. 21, § 27, as amended by St. 1979, c. 705, 
§ 2, which provides in part: "[The division of water pollution control] shall: 
... (14) Undertake immediately whenever there is spillage, seepage or other dis-
charge of oil or hazardous material into or proximate to any of the waters of the 
commonwealth or into any offshore waters which may result in damage to the waters, 
shores or natural resources utilized or enjoyed by citizens of the commonwealth to 
cause said spillage, seepage or discharge to be contained and removed by whatever 
method it considers best." 
In addition, G.L. c. 21, § 40, as amended by St. 1979, c. 705, § 3, authorizes the division 
of water pollution control to enter "upon any property, public or private" to carry out its 
duties under G.L. c. 21, § 27(14). Although the legislature struck out G.L. c. 21, § 27(14), 
and the provision of G.L. c. 21, § 40, quoted above by St. 1983, c. 7, §§ 2, 3, these were 
in effect when the case arose. See Nassr, 394 Mass. at 770-71 n.2, 477 N.E.2d at 990 n.2. 
12 Id. at 772, 477 N.E.2d at 991. 
13 Id. at 770, 477 N.E.2d at 990. 
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rent, the Court found no merit to this claim. 14 The Court also implied 
that the temporary presence of state officials on private property, for the 
purposes of combatting a threat to public health, would under no circum-
stances rise to the level of a taking. 15 Applying this premise to the instant 
case, the Court noted that chapter 27 confers explicit authority upon the 
state to enter the plaintiff's land, 16 and cited the state's action as a 
"classic" example of the exercise of the police power. 17 
On appeal, the Commonwealth did not raise its statutory claims for 
reimbursement, but did restate its claim for restitution. 18 After reviewing 
the applicable statutes and concluding that the common law claims were 
not precluded, 19 the Court considered the Commonwealth's argument 
asserting its entitlement to restitution. The Court noted, initially, that the 
plaintiffs became responsible for the nuisance Matthews had created once 
they excluded him from the premises and resumed possession in April 
1979. It thus became their duty to eliminate the hazard. 20 Nevertheless, 
the Court reasoned that although the Commonwealth had acted upon the 
plaintiffs' original duty, it was not entitled to restitution of benefit con-
ferred unless it also "acted unofficiously and with an intent to charge 
• • • • " 21 Noting that the trial court had found as a matter of fact that the 
Commonwealth had no intent to charge, the Court rejected the state's 
claim.22 
§ 8.17. Historic Districts: Scope of Review. In Conservation Law Foun-
dation v. Director of the Division of Water Pollution Control, 1 the Ap-
peals Court struggled with the language of the Massachusetts Historical 
Commission Act. 2 The controversy involved the "so-called 500 Boylston 
Street development" in the Back Bay of Boston, in which the New 
England Mutual Life Insurance Company and Gerald D. Hines Interests, 
Inc., sought to construct a large office and retail complex.3 Part of the 
14 /d. 
15 /d. at 770-71, 477 N.E.2d at 990-91. 
16 /d. See supra note I I for text of chapter 27, sections 21(14) and 40. 
17 Nassr, 394 Mass. at 771, 477 N.E.2d at 990. The Court analogized the cleanup oper-
ations to the entry of firefighters on private property to extinguish a fire. See id. (citing 
National Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 93 (1969)). 
18 Nassr, 394 at 772, 477 N.E.2d at 991. 
19 /d. at 773, 477 N.E.2d at 991-92. 
20 /d. at 776, 477 N.E.2d at 993. 
21 /d. at 776-77, 477 N.E.2d at 993-94 (quoting the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 115 
(1937)). 
22 Nassr, at 777, 477 N.E.2d at 994. 
§ 8.17. 1 22 Mass. App. Ct. 544, 495 N.E.2d 848 (1986). 
2 G.L. c. 9, §§ 26-270. 
3 Conservation Law Foundation v. Director of Water Pollution Control, 22 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 546, 495 N.E.2d at 850. 
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project site lay within the Back Bay historic district.4 The Appeals Court 
had to resolve whether the Act required a state permit-granting agency 
to seek historical review of an entire proposed project, or simply of that 
portion of the project in which the permit was sought. 5 
Shortly after the developers applied to the Department of Environ-
mental Quality Engineering (DEQE), for a sewer connection permit, the 
Massachusetts Historical Commission informed the DEQE that it was 
bound by statute to evaluate the entire project's impact on "historic, and 
archaeological qualities of State register properties. "6 The DEQE, how-
ever, did not join in the Historical Commission's interpretation of the 
statute, maintaining that the Historical Commission Act only required a 
permit-granting authority to assess the impact of the activity to which 
the permit applied. On May 7, 1985, the Attorney General issued an 
opinion in reference to another development that addressed this issue 
squarely, and sided with the DEQE.7 Adhering to the narrow interpre-
tation of the Act, the DEQE found that the proposed sewer connection 
would have negligible impact on historically important property, notably 
an ancient underground indian fish trapping system that would lay at its 
nearest point, nine feet from the connection. 8 The plaintiffs thereupon 
brought suit challenging this narrow interpretation. Upon motions for 
summary judgment, the superior court held for the defendants, and the 
plaintiffs appealed.9 
The Appeals Court began its review by examining the language of the 
4 /d. 
5 /d. at 545-46, 495 N.E.2d at 849-50. 
6 /d. at 547. St. 1982, c. 152, § 5, added the following two paragraphs to G.L. c. 9, § 27C: 
As early as possible in the planning process of any project undertaken by any 
agency, executive office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or au-
thority of the commonwealth or of any authority established by the general court to 
serve a public purpose and prior to such state body funding, licensing or approving 
any private project, such state body shall determine if the project will affect any 
property listed on the state register of historic places. If the project affects a listed 
property, the state body shall so notify the [Massachusetts Historical] commission. 
Within thirty days of receiving notification, the commission shall determine if the 
project will adversely affect a listed property, and shall send an advisory report to 
the state body describing and documenting its findings. If the commission does not 
notify the state body within thirty days, the state body may proceed with the project. 
If the commission finds that the project will adversely affect a listed property, the 
commission and the state body shall meet to discuss alternatives to the project and 
means of mitigating any adverse effect. The state body, in implementing its final 
plans, shall adopt all prudent and feasible measures that eliminate or mitigate the 
adverse effect. 
G.L. c. 9, § 27C. 
7 Conservation Law Foundation, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 547-48, 495 N.E.2d at 851. 
8 /d. at 548 n.7, 495 N.E.2d at 851 n.7. 
9 /d. at 545-46, 495 N.E.2d at 849-50. 
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statute, in the hope that it would yield an unambiguous meaning. 10 Find-
ing none, the court then examined the statute's legislative and early 
administrative history, therein finding support for the Attorney General's 
narrow interpretation. 11 
The court observed that in hearings before the House Committee on 
State Administration in 1982, the then executive director of the Massa-
chusetts Historical Commission testified that the proposed changes in the 
Act, ultimately enacted as chapter 9, sections 26-27c, would not expand 
the power of the commission, but would simply provide a structure for 
its review. 12 At that time, the court noted, the commission derived its 
review authority not from the Historical Commission Act, 13 but from the 
Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act. 14 That Act, moreover, at 
section 62A, provided that "[i]n the case of a permit application to an 
agency from a private person for a project for which [state] financial 
assistance is not sought the scope of [the environmental impact] report 
and alternatives considered therein shall be limited to that part of the 
project which is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the permit. "15 
The Appeals Court also found support for its interpretation of the statute 
in regulations promulgated by the Historical Commission under the aegis 
of the act, shortly after its enactment. 16 The court then noted that inas-
much as the action pursuant to the permit was simply a sewer connection, 
the DEQE was only required to review the impact of the connection on 
historically important property. 17 
10 Id. at .548-51, 495 N.E.2d at 851-53. 
11 ld. at 551-52, 495 N.E.2d at 852-53. 
12 Id. at 551, 495 N.E.2d at 853. 
13 G.L. c. 9, §§ 26-270. 
14 G.L. c. 30, §§ 61 et seq., as amended by St. 1977, c. 947, §.1. 
"Conservation Law Foundation, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 552, 495 N.E.2d at 853. 
16 ld. at 553, 495 N.E.2d at 854. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 71.03 (1983) provides 
that "[p]rojects [under § 27c] include actions which are: ... (c) carried out pursuant to a 
state . . . permit . . . . " 
17 Conservation Law Foundation, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 552-54, 495 N.E.2d at 853-54. 
The plaintiffs also urged that the court adopt the broader interpretation of chapter 21, 
section 27(14) because this was the interpretation currently in use by the Historical Com-
mission. The court rejected this argument, however, noting in an appendix that it would 
not defer to an incorrect administrative interpretation. Id. at 555 app.(b), 495 N.E.2d at 
855 app.(b). 
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